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REFLECTIONS ON MATSUSHITA AND
"EQUILIBRATING TENDENCIES":
LESSONS FOR COMPETITION AUTHORITIES
STEPHEN CALKINS*
Sometimes the simplest points are best. And it was a simple point that I
made in my fraternal twin publications on "equilibrating tendencies in the
antitrust system":'
In a system of law, as in nature, changes do not occur in a vacuum. Changes
to one part of a legal system may stimulate compensating adjustments else-
where, and the equilibrium position will depend both on the initial action
and on the legal system's reaction. Attention to the initial changes alone
will conceal their likely ultimate consequences.
2
This article looks back on equilibrating tendencies and Matsushita's3 role in
them and looks briefly at current developments and particularly across the
pond to the European Union. It then sets forth several lessons for competition
agencies arising from consideration of equilibrating tendencies.
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. This article draws on my experiences as a Mem-
ber of Ireland's Competition and Consumer Protection Commission and its predecessor institu-
tion, the Competition Authority, and as General Counsel of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission,
but all views expressed herein are exclusively my own. For the avoidance of doubt-a great Irish
expression-I am not speaking on behalf of any Irish or American agency, and although many of
my examples will be American, the suggestions made are quite generally applicable.
I Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equili-
brating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065 (1986) [hereinafter Calkins, Equi-
librating Tendencies]; Stephen Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, with
Special Attention to Summary Judgment and to Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITI-
GATION: NEw EVIHENCE, NEw LEARNING 185 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988). The two publica-
tions both derived from a paper I presented at the Georgetown project on private antitrust
litigation and made largely the same points. I will refer to the law review version because it is
more generally accessible. I continue to be grateful to Robert Pitofsky for his role in sponsoring
my participation in such a rewarding project.
2 Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies, supra note 1, at 1066.
3 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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I. A LOOK BACK
My article gave concrete examples of equilibrating tendencies. For in-
stance, a severe penal code will be mitigated by the stretching of rules to favor
defendants, while, in torts, if even trivial negligence on the part of a plaintiff
will bar recovery, courts will strive to avoid injustice by erecting a series of
exceptions.4 Then, if the stringent substantive law is relaxed, the legal system
can readjust.
Or, to use a competition example, if the simple finding of a vertical agree-
ment to maintain prices automatically results in liability, treble damages, and
attorneys' fees-regardless of power, regardless of effect, regardless of justi-
fication, and regardless of growing uncertainty about just how harmful resale
price maintenance (RPM) really is-do not be surprised if the legal system
responds by making it incredibly hard to prove an agreement.'
As my article explained, antitrust offers a host of examples of equilibrating
tendencies at work. Substantive U.S. antitrust simply is different because of
the (un)holy trinity of treble damages, attorneys' fees, and liberal discovery
(not to mention class actions and jury trials). One can see the influence not
only in substantive but also in procedural law. (Consider, for instance, the
challenge of proving standing and antitrust injury.6)
A. MONSANTO
The classic example is provided by Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp.7 It is one of American antitrust's best-known cases, but the case is
worth reviewing in part to aid non-experts on U.S. law and also in part to
ensure that he words "evidence that tends to exclude the possibility" are fully
appreciated.
In 1977 the Court had relaxed the substantive rules governing vertical re-
straints, making all non-price restraints subject o the rule of reason while
preserving the per se ban on vertical price agreements.' (Some Justices-and
the Solicitor General-would have gone further and judged all vertical re-
4 Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies, supra note 1, at 1067-71, 1075-79.
1 See id. at 1094.
6 See id. at 1101-04.
7 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
8 Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) ("As in Schwinn,
we are concerned here only with nonprice vertical restrictions. The per se illegality of price
restrictions has been established firmly for many years and involves significantly different ques-
tions of analysis and policy."). Justice White, concurring, accurately perceived that the Court was
taking a step down a slippery slope because "[i]t is common ground among the leading advocates
of a purely economic approach to the question of distribution restraints that the economic argu-
ments in favor of allowing vertical nonprice restraints generally apply to vertical price restraints
as well." Id. at 69 (White, J., concurring). He presciently observed that "[t]he effect, if not the
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straints under the rule of reason.') This meant, according to the Monsanto
Court, that it was "of considerable importance that independent action by the
manufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distinguished
from price-fixing agreements, since under present law the latter are subject to
per se treatment and treble damages."10 And it was important to prevent an
RPM agreement from being inferred "from highly ambiguous evidence."
What was the "highly ambiguous evidence" that troubled the Court? Evi-
dence that a manufacturer terminated a large" discounting dealer1 2 after re-
ceiving and "'in response to'" complaints from rival dealers.13 The evidence
was strong enough that a jury found that plaintiff Spray-Rite was terminated
"'pursuant to a conspiracy ... with one or more of [Monsanto's] distributors
to fix, maintain or stabilize resale prices."14 It was strong enough that the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed and rehearing en
banc was denied." That court held: "Proof of distributorship termination in
response to competing distributors' complaints about the terminated distribu-
tor's pricing policies is sufficient to raise an inference of concerted action."16
It pointed to "numerous complaints from competing Monsanto distributors
about Spray-Rite's price-cutting practices" and testimony by a Monsanto offi-
cial "that Spray-Rite was terminated because of the price complaints."17
This was not sufficient for the Supreme Court. "Permitting an agreement o
be inferred merely from the existence of complaints, or even from the fact that
termination came about 'in response to' complaints, could deter or penalize
intention, of the Court's opinion is necessarily to call into question the firmly established per se
rule against price restraints." Id. at 70.
9 See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 n.7 ("The Solicitor General (by brief only) and several other
amici suggest that we take this opportunity to reconsider whether [agreements] ... to fix resale
prices should always be unlawful. They argue that the economic effect of resale price mainte-
nance is little different from agreements on nonprice restrictions. They say that the economic
objections to resale price maintenance that we discussed in Sylvania-such as that it facilitates
horizontal cartels-can be met easily in the context of rule-of-reason analysis.... We ... decline
to reach the question, and we decide the case in the context in which it was decided below and
argued here.") (citations omitted).
0 
Id. at 763; see also id. at 764 ("In sum, [t]o permit the inference of concerted action on the
basis of receiving complaints alone and thus to expose the defendant to treble damage liability
would both inhibit management's exercise of independent business judgment and emasculate the
terms of the statute."' (alteration in original) (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980))).
11 "Spray-Rite was the 10th largest out of approximately 100 distributors of Monsanto's pri-
mary corn herbicide." Id. at 757.
12 "Spray-Rite was a discount operation, buying in large quantities and selling at a low mar-
gin." Id. at 756.
's Id. at 759.
14 Id. at 758 n.2 (quoting special interrogatory).
1' Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982).
16 Id. at 1239.
17Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 759.
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perfectly legitimate conduct."" Complaints are common and other dealers are
a prime source of information, according to the Court. "Thus, something
more than evidence of complaints is needed. There must be evidence that
tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and non-terminated dis-
tributors were acting independently."1 9 In the end, there was such evidence-
the Court reviewed evidence of Monsanto demands that discounting be ended,
evidence of a distributor promising to charge list prices, and more. But the
important point is that the words "evidence that ends to exclude the possibil-
ity" of unilateral action means evidence more powerful than evidence of com-
plaints about discounting and of termination in response to those complaints.
The point bears repeating. Complaints about discounting, by rival firms,
and testimony from a (former) company witness that termination was in re-
sponse to those complaints, certainly suggest an understanding about pricing.
Why would someone be terminated in response to complaints about discount-
ing unless there was an understanding about discounting? In other words,
"tends to exclude the possibility" does not just mean "suggests" or "sup-
ports"-it means something more.
B. MATSUSHITA
That set the stage for Matsushita; indeed, the Matsushita petition for certio-
rari was filed only three weeks after rehearing was denied in Monsanto.20 Pe-
titioners argued that "[a] s recently explained by this Court in Monsanto . . . if
an inference of concerted price fixing may be drawn from ambiguous evi-
dence, there is a considerable danger that lawful and pro-competitive conduct
will be deterred or penalized."21 The Court was presented with what it and
others considered a preposterous plaintiffs' claim that had been thoroughly
aired before a distinguished district court judge who had patiently considered
the evidence and granted summary judgment to defendants, only to have the
Third Circuit reverse. The governments of Australia, Canada, France, Japan,
and the United Kingdom appeared as amici to express concern. The Solicitor
General supported the defendants. The Court reversed and, in doing so, wrote
8 Id. at 763.
19 Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
20 The Monsanto rehearing was denied May 14, 1984. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3829 (1984). The
Matsushita petition was filed June 7, 1984. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3921 (1984). Certiorari was
granted in Matsushita on April 1, 1985, after the Court asked for and received the Solicitor
General's (supportive) views. See 53 U.S.L.W. 3696 (1985).
21 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 27, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae [on
petition for certiorari] at 17, Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574 (No. 83-2004) (filed Jan. 4, 1985) ("Just
last Term, the Court admonished in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., No. 82-914 (Mar.
20, 1984), slip op. 8, that permitting the inference of an anticompetitive agreement from highly
ambiguous evidence 'could deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct.').
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in a way that I have suggested could be considered to be adopting wholesale
the "transplantation of Monsanto's principles . . . for use in all antitrust sum-
mary [judgment] proceedings."22
And what could be seen as transplanted was a very particular, pro-defen-
dant approach:
But antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous
evidence in a § 1 case.. .. To survive a motion for summary judgment or for
a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must
present evidence 'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged con-
spirators acted independently.23
Those words set out a high standard, we know, because they were lifted
from Monsanto. Now, a high standard may have been appropriate in Matsu-
shita itself, because it challenged cutting prices and, as the Court said, "mis-
taken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they
chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."24 But
whereas Monsanto addressed proof of a vertical agreement that would, if
found, result in per se liability, and Matsushita addressed what seemed to be
outlandish claims seeking a big payoff for challenging price-cutting, the stan-
dards set out by the Court could not easily be so limited.
In my 1986 article, I wrote that "the equilibrating lesson of Matsushita will
not be easily cabined. It can be expected to extend to summary judgments in
other kinds of antitrust cases, and also to motions to dismiss and for directed
verdicts."25 The point was obvious, so I don't now boast, but I was right.
II. POST-MATSUSHITA
Matsushita became a landmark case. More than 100,000 cases have cited
it,26 including 6,164 federal antitrust cases.27 Twenty-five Supreme Court
cases have cited it,28 including 14 well-known antitrust cases, most of which
quoted from it.29 Indeed, seven of them quoted Matsushita's colorful words,
22 Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies, supra note 1, at 1125.
23 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (quoting Monsanto 465 U.S. at 764) (emphasis added); see also
id. at 593 ("In Monsanto, we emphasized that courts should not permit factfinders to infer con-
spiracies when such inferences are implausible, because the effect of such practices is often to
deter procompetitive conduct.").
24 Id. at 594. This is not the place to debate the Court's confidence that "predatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful." Id. at 589.
25 Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies, supra note 1, at 1127.
26 Westlaw: 109,935 on June 8, 2017.
27 Westlaw, Antitrust Practice Area, Cases, searching for "Matsushita /6 zenith", search run
June 8, 2017.
28 Westlaw June 8, 2017.
29 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,
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"cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of com-
petition"3 0 and six of them quoted the warning that mistakes could "chill the
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."31 And 4,802 federal
courts of appeal cases have cited it, with 31 using the words "essence of com-
petition" and 35 the words "chill the very conduct."3 2 Because of the fre-
quency with which the issue arises, 146 court of appeals opinions cite
Matsushita and use the words "tends to exclude."3 3 (Three Supreme Court
cases-Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (in dissent),3 4 City of Colombia v.
Omni Outdoor Advertising,3 5 and Business Electronics v. Sharp (in dis-
sent)36-quote the famous words, with the last two quoting Monsanto directly,
the first one quoting Matsushita quoting Monsanto.)
In Equilibrating Tendencies, I pointed to a variety of substantive and proce-
dural aspects of competition law that could well be different because of the
existence of the private treble damages remedy.3 7 Absolute proof was unreal-
istic, of course, but one could see a number of ways that the law had been
constrained by concern about over-deterrence. It seemed particularly clear
that standing rules would have been more hospitable in a single-damages
world.
549 U.S. 312 (2007); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764 (1993); Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Summit Health, Ltd. v.
Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 340 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 397 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717
(1988); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.,
479 U.S. 104 (1986). Matsushita was also cited in Ford Motor Co. v. Tunis Bros. Co., 475 U.S.
1105 (1986), which simply vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded for
reconsideration.
30 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (quoted in
Linkline, Weyerhaeuser, State Oil, Brooke Group, Kodak, ARCO, and Cargill).
s' Id. at 594 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984))
(quoted in Linkline, Weyerhaeuser, Trinko, Brooke Group, Kodak, and ARCO). For an argument
that Matsushita's tough "tends to exclude" approach can be and/or should be limited to the
evaluation of arguably procompetitive evidence, see Brief Amicus Curiae for Law Professors and
Antitrust/Indus. Org. Scholars in Support of Petitioner, Evergreen Partnering Grp., v. Pactiv
Corp., No. 16-1148 (Apr. 21, 2017).
32 Westlaw June 8, 2017.
33 Westlaw June 8, 2017.
34 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 397 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
36 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 753 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies, supra note 1, at 1088-04.
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Since then, the Supreme Court has continued its campaign for greater ob-
jectivity and ever-clearer standards.38 Case after case has addressed the per-
ceived problem of mistakes, which presumably are likely to be made by juries
applying their judgment in situations in which reasonable persons can differ.
There's no question but that he private treble-damages remedy has shaped
American antitrust.39
The issue is posed most frequently by a motion for summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law-that was Monsanto-or a motion to dismiss,
which was addressed in Twombly. Twombly relied on Matsushita, Monsanto,
and Theatre Enterprises40 for "the requirement of plausibility and the need for
something more than merely parallel behavior."41 What Twombly added-and
one can see equilibrating tendencies at work-was its admonishment that "it
is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in advance
of discovery,[42] but quite another to forget that proceeding to antitrust discov-
ery can be expensive."43 The Court depicted a world of "enormous expense of
discovery" with little hope of judicial control, and responded by calling for
stringent requirements for the plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss.
That depiction, whether or not it is correct, has made a powerful impression
on subsequent decisions. Scores of examples include colorful expressions of
38 See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452 (2009) ("We
have repeatedly emphasized the importance of clear rules in antitrust law."); Stephen Calkins,
The October 1992 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: More Objectivity Than Ever, 62 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 327 (1994); Stephen Calkins, The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term and Antitrust: To-
ward Greater Certainty, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (1992). The Court's desired clarity has been
limited largely to defendant-benefiting clarity. Cf FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013)
(reverse payment settlement agreements are subject to antitrust scrutiny but only under rule of
reason); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (resale price
maintenance should be judged by the rule of reason).
39 See also 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR & CHRISTINE
PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAw ¶ 330b2 (4th ed. 2014) ("Treble damages can be an embar-
rassment to antitrust policy. . . . [T]he availability of damages, and especially of treble damages,
can limit the development of antitrust law."). But cf Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble"
Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1993) (arguing that factors such as the
absence of prejudgment interest and inability of purchasers to recover for reduced output effec-
tively reduce treble damages to single damages); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS vi (2007) ("The Commission recommends no change to the fundamen-
tal remedial scheme of the antitrust laws: the treble damages remedy and plaintiffs' ability to
recover attorneys' fees. On balance, the current scheme appears to be effective in enabling plain-
tiffs to pursue litigation that enhances the deterrence of unlawful behavior and compensates
victims.").
40 Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
41 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 (2007); see Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust
Bookends: The 2006 Supreme Court Term in Historical Context, ANTITRUST, Fall 2007, at 21, 23
[hereinafter Gavil, Bookends] (Twombly "is a direct descendant of Matsushita and Trinko.").
42 Cf Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
43 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
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concern about discovery abuse." Many opinions quote (and rely on)
Twombly's assertion that "antitrust discovery can be expensive." Westlaw
lists 515 federal antitrust cases that cite Twombly and mention "discovery"
and some version of "expensive" in the same paragraph.4 5
Equilibrating tendencies are at work.
III. A LOOK ACROSS THE POND
It was with some embarrassment that I read my "equilibrating" article and
looked in vain for commentary on European competition law. Where, I won-
dered, was that obviously interesting and informative comparison? Indeed,
with hindsight, the comparison cried out to be made. Here was a competition
enforcement system largely without criminal penalties or treble damages or
one-way attorneys' fees or liberal discovery or juries, and a system without
the widely disparaged American-style class actions.4 6 If equilibrating tenden-
cies work outside the United States-they surely work in the United King-
dom, 4 7 and it's hard to believe they don't also work in civil law systems4 8 -
one would expect to see quite different competition law.
44 See, e.g., Insulate SB, Inc. v. Advanced Finishing Sys., Inc., 797 F.3d 538, 543 (8th Cir.
2015) ("Given 'the unusually high cost of discovery in antitrust cases,' 'the limited "success of
judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse[,]" and "the threat [that] discovery expense will
push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases . . .," the federal courts have been
reasonably aggressive in weeding out meritless antitrust claims at the pleading stage.'" (altera-
tion in original) (citation omitted) (quoting NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir.
2007), and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558)); Mayor & City Council of Balt., Md. v. Citigroup, Inc.,
709 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2013) ("If we permit antitrust plaintiffs to overcome a motion to
dismiss simply by alleging parallel conduct, we risk propelling defendants into expensive anti-
trust discovery on the basis of acts that could just as easily turn out to have been rational business
behavior as they could a proscribed antitrust conspiracy." (citing Twombly)); In re Text Messag-
ing Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Twombly ... is designed to spare
defendants the expense of responding to bulky, burdensome discovery unless the complaint pro-
vides enough information to enable an inference that the suit has sufficient merit to warrant
putting the defendant to the burden of responding to at least a limited discovery demand. When a
district court . . . allows a complex case of extremely dubious merit o proceed, it bids fair to
immerse the parties in the discovery swamp-'that Serbonian bog . . . where annies whole have
sunk' (Paradise Lost ix 592-94) . . . .") (alteration in original) (affirming refusal to dismiss).
45 Westlaw for "twombly and (discovery /p expens!)" filtered for topic "antitrust," run June
16, 2017.
46 See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?,
in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CLASS ACTIONS IN EUROPE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA 37
(Jfirgen G. Backhaus, Alberto Cassone & Giovanni B. Ramello eds., 2012).
47 See Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies, supra note 1, at 1067-71 (example from United
Kingdom).
48 See Wouter P.J. Wils, The Relationship Between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private
Actions for Damages, 32 WORLD COMPETITION 3, 23-25 (2009) [hereinafter Wils, Relationship]
(worrying about the potential impact); see also Wouter P.J. Wils, Private Enforcement of EU
Antitrust Law and Its Relationship with Public Enforcement: Past, Present and Future, 40
WORLD COMPETITION 3 (2017) [hereinafter Wils, Private Enforcement] (same).
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Most important-and although, as discussed below, this is changing-Eu-
rope had a competition system with very little private enforcement.49 Euro-
pean private enforcement of competition law is nothing like its American
counterpart. In the United States, antitrust largely is private antitrust; in Eu-
rope, competition enforcement is public enforcement. As the European Com-
mission has stated, "[T]o date most victims of infringements of the EU
competition rules in practice do not obtain compensation for the harm
suffered." 0
The lack of private enforcement is not because compensation is opposed in
theory. As the Court of Justice declared in 2001, "The full effectiveness of
Article [101] . . . would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to
claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to
restrict or distort competition."1 But "various legal and procedural hurdles in
the Member States' rules governing actions for antitrust damages before na-
tional courts"5 2 have resulted in a singularly ineffective damages remedy.5 3
Just as the system of law enforcement is very different, the law itself re-
mains quite different. As someone who has enforced competition law on both
sides of the Atlantic, I am struck by how different the legal standards are
outside of most mergers and hard-core cartels. For all the talk about "conver-
gence" between the United States and the European Union,5 4 there are still
49 See, e.g., RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAw 312 (8th ed. 2015) ("His-
torically within the EU public enforcement of competition law has been much more important
than private enforcement."); Wils, Private Enforcement, supra note 48 (short history of private
enforcement).
1o Fur. Comm'n, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages Under National Law for Infringements of the
Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and the European Union, COM(2013) 404
final Explanatory Memorandum at 4; see Eur. Comm'n, DG Competition, Actions for Damages
> Overview, ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/#steps ("[I]n practice most vic-
tims, particularly SMEs and consumers, rarely obtain compensation."); Alison Jones, Private
Enforcement of EU Competition Law: A Comparison with, and Lessons from, the US, in
HARMONISING EU COMPETITION LITIGATION: THE NEw DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 15 (Maria
Bergstrdm, Marios lacovides & Magnus Strand eds., 2016) [hereinafter Jones, Private Enforce-
ment] (noting slight increase).
1' Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, 2001 E.C.R. I-6314, ¶ 26. For an overview see
WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 49, at 312-28. Of course, concerns about private enforcement have
been raised by various commentators. See, e.g., Sebastian Peyer, Cartel Members Only-Revisit-
ing Private Antitrust Policy in Europe, 60 INT'L & COMPARATIVE L.Q. 627 (2011) (urging a
focus on hard-core cartels); Wils, Relationship, supra note 48 (emphasizing compensatory ole).
52 Eur. Comm'n, White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules,
COM (2008) 165 final § 1.1 (Apr. 2, 2008); see also Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 50,
at 4.
1 The barriers to private litigation in the European Union are nicely catalogued in Alison
Jones, Private Enforcement, supra note 50, at 26-33.
54 See, e.g., Margaret Bloom, The U.S. and EU Move Towards Substantial Antitrust Conver-
gence on Consumer Welfare Based Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Summer 2005, at 18; Thomas K.
Cheng, Convergence and Its Discontents: A Reconsideration of the Merits of Convergence of
20181 23
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striking differences in the parts of the law where U.S. private enforcement
dominates. A 2013 critical analysis found significant or substantial conver-
gence only with respect to assessment of mergers, leniency programs, and the
"mode" of regulation of cartels (ex ante or ex post)5-all situations where
U.S. enforcement is almost exclusively governmental, so there is much less
role for equilibrating tendencies. In contrast, there was "insignificant conver-
gence" in assessment of abuse of dominant positions. Eleanor Fox revisited
monopoly/abuse law and found that 25 years had yielded little convergence,
especially at the court level.56
In a way, the extent of difference is surprising. Powerful forces are behind
the drive for convergence. Law firms practice on both sides of the Atlantic, as
do economic consulting firms. Europeans regularly attend and participate in
U.S. conferences, and vice versa.5 7 The ICN and the OECD work tirelessly to
resolve tensions and encourage adoption of "best practices." Enforcers regu-
larly work closely together on a host of matters. Merger guidelines have be-
come a common language of competition policy58 and inevitably drive toward
common approaches to market definition, market power, entry, and efficien-
cies-all concepts that resonate throughout competition enforcement.
But in a way the difference is not surprising. In part this is because the
European Commission has a market integration purpose that is missing in the
United States.59 Also important is history, in particular Europe's larger num-
Global Competition Law, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 433 (2012); Yann Davie, EU and US Antitrust:
Converging Approaches to Monopolies?, LE PETIT JuRiSTE (Mar. 11, 2014); see also loannis
Kokkoris, Introduction: EU and U.S. Competition Enforcement-Convergence or Divergence,
59 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (2014).
11 Dzmitry Bartalevich, EU Competitive Policy Since 1990: How Substantial Is Convergence
Towards U.S. Antitrust?, 6 J. CENTRUM CATHEDRA 273 (2013).
56 Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance: Why Europe is Diferent, 59
ANTITRUST BULL. 129, 150 (2014).
17 More than a quarter of the 3233 attendees at the 2017 ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meet-
ing came from the 65 foreign countries that were represented. Email to Stephen Calkins from
Margaret Stafford (June 9, 2017) (on file with author).
8 For the third annual Baxt lecture at the University of Melbourne, I reviewed 13 merger
guidelines (ACCC 2008; Brazil 2001; Canada 2011; EC 2004; Finland 2004; France 2009; Ger-
many 2012, Ireland 2002; Japan 2010; New Zealand 2003; Tanzania 2011; UK 2010; and U.S.
2010) and found that all but one (Germany) used the SSNIP; all but one (Tanzania) used the
words "close substitutes" and the "timely/likely/sufficient" wording for entry; all but three (Bra-
zil, New Zealand, and Tanzania) the HHI; and, amazingly enough, all but two (Brazil and Japan)
the very American word "maverick." Stephen Calkins, Dir. of Mergers Div., The Competition
Authority Ireland, The Third Annual Baxt Lecture (Melbourne Law Sch.): The Global Conversa-
tion About Merger Review and Powerful Buyers (Oct. 23, 2012) (on file with author); see also
Annual Baxt Lecture, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne, law.unimelb.edu
.au/centres/clen/engagement/annual-baxt-lecture.
9 Eur. Comm'n, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010 O.J. (C 130) 1, ¶ 7 ("Assessing
vertical restraints is also important in the context of the wider objective of achieving an inte-
grated internal market. . . . Companies should not be allowed to re-establish private barriers
between Member States where State barriers have been successfully abolished.").
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ber of formerly state-owned dominant firms. 6 0 But in part this is because of
equilibrating tendencies.
Consider the concept of "false positives," or incorrect findings of antitrust
liability. This was the concept to which the Matsushita Court was referring
when it cautioned that "mistaken i ferences in cases such as this one are espe-
cially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are de-
signed to protect."61 The term was first used in this manner in the famous
Microsoft opinion in 2001.62 The Supreme Court used it for the first time in
Trinko in 2004,63 and again in Twombly in 2007.6 Since Twombly, U.S.
courts have used it 95 times in antitrust cases, or almost 10 times a year.65
In contrast, searching all EU case law on Westlaw 66 yielded only five uses
of "false positive" and only three-all Advocate General opinions-referring
to possibly erroneous case outcomes.67 There is less of what in the United
60 Lars-Hendrik Rdller, Exploitative Abuses, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAw ANNUAL 2007:
A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 525 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds.,
2008).
61 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986).
62 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("Recognizing
the potential benefits from tying, see Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21 n.33, the Court in Jefferson
Parish forged a separate-products test that, like those of market power and substantial foreclo-
sure, attempts to screen out false positives under per se analysis.").
63 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)
("The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability. One false-
positive risk is that an incumbent LEC's failure to provide a service with sufficient alacrity might
have nothing to do with exclusion ... [e]ven if the problem of false positives did not exist . . .
(emphasis added).
64 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) ("The inadequacy of showing paral-
lel conduct or interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent
with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business
strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market. See, e.g., AEI-Brookings
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Richard Epstein, Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Sepa-
rating Fact from Fantasy, Related Publication 06-08, pp. 3-4 (2006) (discussing problem of
'false positives' in § 1 suits).").
65 Westlaw "all federal" database, limited to case "topic antitrust," search for "false positive."
Calculation for May 22, 2007 (post-Twombly), to March 22, 2017.
66 "European Union Cases" ("Court of Justice: begins with 1954; Court of First Instance:
begins with 1989; C Series of the Official Journal: begins with 1985"), checked June 9, 2017.
67 Case C-177/16, Opinion of AG Wahl 142, Biedriba 'Autortiestbu un komunic~anks kon-
sultaciju antira-Latvijas Autoru apvieniba'v Konkurences padome (Apr. 6, 2017)
("[A]ntitrust authorities and economists generally agree that the exercise consisting of detennin-
ing the benchmark price in a case of possible excessive pricing carries a high risk of producing
both type I errors (or false positives: a price is mistakenly considered to be above the competitive
price) and type II errors (or false negatives: a price is mistakenly considered not to be above the
competitive price).") (citation omitted); id. 1 103 ("[I]t has been correctly argued that type I
errors in competition decisions concerning unilateral conduct involve a much larger cost for the
society than type II errors."); Case C-8/08, Opinion of AG Kokott, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v.
Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandsc Mededingingsautoriteit 1 45 n.33 (2009) ("Although the
national court does not explicitly mention a rule of presumption, it stresses the need to prevent
'false positive outcomes'."); Case C-202/07P, Opinion of AG MazAk, France T616com SA v.
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States is a common concern. In a world with relatively little important private
litigation, and with (traditionally) a respected agency making many of the
enforcement decisions, there is much less fear of "false positives," and the
consequences of mistakes may not be as great. If an agency will look fairly
and objectively at actual competitive effects before bringing any case, there is
less risk in having what in the United States might seem to be an over-inclu-
sive per se (or "object") rule or excessively pro-enforcement presumptions.
This can be seen in a variety of competition issues. European enforcers
intervene to address concerns about oligopolistic signaling and potential sig-
naling68 whereas U.S. enforcers, constrained by Section 1 law, narrowed by
equilibrating tendencies, would hesitate to proceed.69 There is no European
equivalent to the Monsanto/Matsushita requirement of evidence that "tends to
exclude" the possibility of unilateral action. Monsanto said it was "of consid-
erable importance" to limit findings of resale price maintenance agreements
because such agreements "are subject to per se treatment and treble dam-
Comm'n, ECLI:EU:C:2008:520, ¶[73 n.52 (2008) (citing an article arguing that "requiring proof
of possibility of recoupment would in principle be beneficial to alleviate the cost of errors (espe-
cially false positives) in alleged predatory pricing cases"). It is noteworthy that two of the cases
involved national enforcement agencies rather than the Commission.
68 See, e.g., Press Release, Fur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Accepts Commitments by
Container Liner Shipping Companies on Price Transparency (July 7, 2016) (IP-16-2446) (com-
mitments "to increase price transparency for customers and to reduce the likelihood of coordinat-
ing prices"); Press Release, Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM), Commitments to ACM
Improve Competition in Ready-Mix Concrete Sector (June 29, 2016) (even without evidence of a
violation, the Dutch agency extracted commitments to ease entry and end collaborations among
substantial firms); Press Release, Hellenic Competition Comm'n (Apr. 14, 2016) (acceptance of
commitments by the three largest Greek steel producers and their trade association that would
"change the terms and conditions of their ongoing cooperation within their trade association" so
that information exchanges do "not increase the prospects of [their] coordinating"-even though
there was "insufficient evidence" to show collusion or abuse of dominance); see also Mark
Briggs, Greece Irons Out Commitments with Steel Companies, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv. (Apr.
15, 2016) ("The commitments prevent the companies and association from requesting commer-
cially sensitive data; distributing recommendations based on data the association forwards on to
them from statistical organisations; and clarify the structure of the association to ensure there is
no personnel spillover between it and the companies.").
69 For discussion of signaling under U.S. law, see William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and
Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REv. 393 (2011); William H. Page, Signaling and
Agreement in Antitrust Law (Apr. 5, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2620786. In theory, the FTC should be able to use Section 5-which cannot be privately
enforced-to reach conduct not subject to the Sherman Act. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REv. 871, 893 (2010) ("There are good
reasons for the Commission to use § 5 of the FTC Act to reach more broadly than the Sherman
Act has reached .... ); see also Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (2006) (concurring opinion
of Comm'r Leibowitz) ("Because of these relatively mild consequences, Section 5 can fairly
extend more broadly than the antitrust laws."), rev'd, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Although
the FTC has occasionally used Section 5 to reach beyond the Sherman Act-in recent years,
typically in "invitations to collude" cases, e.g., U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 150 F.T.C. 1 (2010) (consent
order)-the modem FTC has proceeded only with considerable caution. Cf FED. TRADE
COMM'N, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding "Unfair Methods of Competition"
Under Section 5 of the FTC Act (2015).
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ages"70-treble damages that can be sought by a host of unhappy individuals
and entities (and class actions) with no particular interest in promoting com-
petition. But it is of much less "considerable importance" to draw such dis-
tinctions if a challenge would be brought only by an enforcer charged with
promoting the general welfare.
Leegin abandoned the per se rule for RPM in part because of the "problem
... that a jury might conclude [that a seller's] unilateral policy was really a
vertical agreement, subjecting it to treble damages and potential criminal lia-
bility." 71 In contrast, were penalties smaller and challenges possible only if a
sophisticated enforcer concluded that one was justified, it could be more ap-
propriate to regard RPM as a "hard-core" restriction with the "object" of re-
stricting competition.72 Similarly, for predatory pricing cases, Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. imposed a separate requirement
of proving recoupment, in addition to below-cost pricing, because "the costs
of an erroneous finding of liability are high." 73 Again, such a finding could be
by a jury in a case brought by a private entity with no duty to serve the public
interest. Where a case could be brought only by a public-interest-minded en-
forcer, there may be less need for such a strict two-part test, and in Europe
recoupment is not required.74 Excessive pricing is simply not an antitrust is-
sue in the United States,75 whereas the possible offense is very much alive in
Europe.76 Or, for the last example, U.S. courts tend to use bright-line tests for
the absence of monopoly power, such that "courts rarely find monopoly
7o Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984).
7' Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 903 (2007) (citing Mon-
santo, 465 U.S. 752, and Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1988),
where the Court expressed concern that with too-easy proof of RPM, "[m]anufacturers would be
likely to forgo legitimate and competitively useful conduct rather than risk treble damages and
perhaps even criminal penalties"). The claimed threat of criminal liability was entirely theoreti-
cal, but the Court still mentioned it.
72 WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 49, at 129-30, 703-04.
73 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993).
74 WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 49, at 786-87; see Case C-202/07P, France T616com SA v.
Comm'n, 2009 E.C.R. 1-02369, 1 110.
7 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
76 See, e.g., Press Release, Fur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Investigation
into Aspen Pharma's Pricing Practices for Cancer Medicines (May 15, 2017) (IP/17/1323); Case
CE/9742-13, Decision of the Competition and Markets Authority, Unfair Pricing in Respect of
the Supply of Phenytoin Sodium Capsules in the UK (Dec. 7, 2016) (pricing excessive and
unfair) (non-confidential decision). It is worth noting that the original Areeda-Turner call for
allowing equitable challenges to "persistent and not-inevitable monopoly" was limited to govern-
ment proceedings. See 3 PHLLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 638




power when market share is less than about 50 percent,"77 whereas the Euro-
pean Court of Justice presumes dominance from a 50 percent share and has
found dominance below that level.78 U.S. courts seem to be motivated to seek
easy ways to dispense with private treble damage cases.
IV. A LOOK ACROSS THE POND AND INTO THE FUTURE
To some extent the future in Europe is already here. What had traditionally
been an enforcement system almost exclusively focused on a single elite
agency is in the process of being replaced by a different model, with more and
more decisions being taken by national enforcers and national courts address-
ing private litigation. Regulation 1/200379 "empowered Member States' com-
petition authorities (NCAs) and national courts to apply all aspects of the EU
competition rules . . . ."0 From May 2004 to December 2013, the European
Commission issued 122 enforcement decisions and the NCAs 665,81 with
NCAs' increasing their output over time.8 2
This is a very different world. During the 8 1/2 years studied, the United
Kingdom took only 16 decisions and Poland only 12, but France took 90,
Germany 84, Italy 82, and Spain 73 (compared to the Commission's 88).83
And whereas 63 percent of the Commission's decisions addressed cartels or
other horizontal restraints, only 46 percent of NCA decisions did.8 4 Fully 27
percent of NCA decisions addressed vertical agreements, compared to only 9
percent of Commission decisions.5 Heroic efforts to coordinate enforcement
approaches cannot prevent divergences and inconsistencies. And whereas a
single enforcer can simply choose not to bring certain kinds of cases and thus
slowly reduce or end some kinds of enforcement (Americans can think about
how the FTC gradually just stopped bringing Robinson-Patman cases), that
77 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTs 231 (8th ed. 2017);
cf id. at 338 (attempted monopolization "claims involving between 30% and 50% shares should
usually be rejected, except when conduct is very likely to achieve monopoly or when conduct is
invidious") (quoting M & M Med. Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., 981
F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1993)). Although monopoly power may be proven by direct evidence,
such evidence "is not frequently available." Id. at 226.
78 WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 49, at 192-93.
79 Council Regulation No. 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 (explaining the implementation of the
rules on competition in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty).
80 Eur. Comm'n, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council: Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement Under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Fu-
ture Perspectives, COM (2014) 453 final, 1 1 (July 9, 2014).
8 Id. ¶8.
82 Wouter P.J. Wils, Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003-A Retrospective, 4 J. EUR. COMPETI-
TIoN L. & PRAC. 293, 296 (2013).
83 Id.
84 Eur. Comm'n, Communication from the Commission, supra note 80, ¶¶ 11-13.
85 Id. U¶ 12-13.
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kind of quiet flexibility is unavailing when a couple of dozen government
entities can charge on without the support of the central authority.
Also changing is private litigation. The Directive on Antitrust Damages
Actions entered into force on December 26, 2014, with Member States to
implement by December 27, 2016.86 (Implementation "is ongoing," with
some Member States still engaged in consultation but with 25 communicating
full transposition.8 7) A Commission Recommendation on "collective redress"
(class actions) invited Member States to introduce these mechanisms by July
26, 2015, and promised to assess the Recommendation's implementation by
July 26, 2017.11
The extent and desirability of change is not without debate. Procedural
changes won't be made uniformly or with instant results.8 9 Noted observer/
participant Wouter Wils has expressed relief that the "basic orientation is
most unlikely to change in the foreseeable future."90
My sense-expressed with caution since it is expressed from afar-is that
significant change is inevitable. Private damages actions are becoming and
will continue to become more common. The steady drumbeat of firsts-first
final ruling in a Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) competition law dam-
ages case, first fast-track competition claim before the CAT under new rules,
first antitrust class action launched9 1-creates momentum. The United King-
dom has adopted real, opt-in collective actions.92 The legal press now regu-
larly reports on new claims filed against MasterCard and Visa.93 Litigation
86 Directive 2014/104/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November
2014 on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages Under National Law for Infringements
of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 2014 O.J.
(L 349) 1.
87 Fur. Comm'n, Directorate for Competition, Actions for Damages > Directive on Antitrust
Damages Actions, ec.europa.eulcompetition/antitrust/actionsdamages/directiveen.html (updated
as of Nov. 13, 2017).
88 Eur. Comm'n, Directorate for Competition, Actions for Damages > Overview, ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html.
89 Challenges to change are reviewed in Jones, Private Enforcement, supra note 50, and Se-
bastian Peyer, Compensation and the Damages Directive (Ctr. for Competition Policy Working
Paper 15-10, 2015).
90 Wils, Private Enforcement, supra note 48, at 39.
91 European Competition Law Newsletter-August 2016, McGUIREWOODS (Aug. 17, 2016)
[hereinafter McGUIREWOODS, Newsletter]; Matthew Reynolds, In on the Act: First Antitrust
Class Action Launched in the UK, CLASS ACTION COUNTERMEASURES (June 27, 2016); see also
Nicholas Heaton, The Introduction of Class Actions for Competition Claims in the UK, ANTI-
TRUST SOURCE (Feb. 2016), www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrustsource/
feb16_heaton_2l12f.pdf. The Brexit vote makes it important to mention that Germany and the
Netherlands have also become known as desirable venues for filing competition cases.
92 Heaton, supra note 91.
93 E.g., Melissa Lipman, Visa, MasterCard Hit with More UK Swipe Fee Antitrust Claims,
LAw360 (June 14, 2017).
20181 29
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
funding is a growing business.9 4 Plaintiff-oriented law firms regularly report
on "developments [that] provide ever greater opportunities for private en-
forcement."95 Even establishment law firms are flirting with promoting pri-
vate enforcement: "Private competition law litigation in the UK continues to
develop apace. Companies of any size (including small and medium-sized
enterprises, or SMEs) should consider its availability when evaluating options
for responding to the activities of third parties, including suppliers and com-
petitors."9 6 Conferences and workshops advertise its availability. 7 And with
plaintiffs' competition practices becoming established,98 private enforcement
can build on private enforcement. At first, cases will be mostly "follow-on"
proceedings, but even that can change the dynamic.
With enforcement increasingly by a diversity of entities, and particularly by
private parties, change will come. There will be equilibrating tendencies.
Particularly in such a changing environment (but elsewhere as well), agencies
should take account of lessons from those tendencies.
V. LESSONS FOR ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
The basic lesson is to understand and appreciate the role of equilibrating
tendencies. Actions will have reactions. Agencies experiencing or working
to cause change must think through the likely indirect consequences of any
change.
A. ANTICIPATE EQUILIBRATING TENDENCIES
European enforcers, in particular, can expect to see challenges continue to
increase in response to the changing nature of enforcement. Already, for in-
stance, the enforcement of vertical restraints law has largely devolved to na-
tional enforcers.99 It is one thing to have a presumption of illegality secure in
the knowledge that it will be exercised with expertise, judgment, and re-
straint-but can one presume that enforcers in all of 28 countries will exercise
94 Ben Hancock, Who Rules the World of Litigation Funding?, AM. LAW. (Mar. 30, 2017).
91 Article: EC Competition Law: Latest Developments Provide Ever Greater Opportunities for
Private Enforcement, QUINN EMANUEL TRIAL LAWYERS (Jan. 2015); see also Significant Devel-
opments in Private Enforcement of Competition Law, HAUSFELD (May 5, 2014).
96 MCGUIREWOODS, Newsletter, supra note 91; see also Helen Kelly, Competition Law Dam-
ages Actions-Rules Make Ireland an Attractive Venue for Competition Litigation, MATHESON
(Feb. 28, 2017).
97 See, e.g., Private Enforcement of Competition Law, COMPETITION LAW, law.knect365.com/
private-enforcement/.
98 Scott Flaherty, U.S. Plaintifs Firms Eye Antitrust Litigation in Europe, AM. LAW. (Sept.
28, 2015). Hausfeld, for instance, boasts 45 lawyers in four European offices. See Our People,
HAUSFELD (2017).
99 Filippo Amato, RPM in the European Union: Any Developments Since Leegin?, CPI ANTI-
TRUST CHRON., Winter 2013, at 1, 5.
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it this way? (As the Commission has delicately recognized, "[a] number of
authorities struggle with insufficient human and financial resources."100)
Agencies, which are regularly provided with opportunities to influence the
system of competition enforcement,101 should remember that major changes
require particular attention to likely reactions. Thus, the line of U.S. cases
applying a relaxed standard to proof of damages in competition cases,102
which might have seemed a boon to plaintiffs, helped trigger the more de-
manding approach applied to the fact of damages03 and the requirement that
the plaintiff prove "antitrust injury." 104 U.S. plaintiffs may benefit from treble
damages, liberal discovery, and relaxed pleading, but those same factors serve
to motivate judges to work to make substantive law more demanding.105
Consider, for instance, criminal penalties, which in my view are appropriate
for hard-core cartel activities.106 Criminal penalties make sense in part be-
cause they send a message of how seriously a country takes cartel enforce-
ment. But introducing criminal penalties is very different from establishing
an effective criminal enforcement regime. The seriousness of the penalties
automatically makes entities more likely to resist their imposition while at the
same time making liability harder to impose.10 7 The United Kingdom has had
100 Eur. Comm'n, DG Competition, Inception Impact Assessment: Enhancing Competition in
the EU for the Benefit of Businesses and Consumers-Reinforcement of he Application of EU
Competition Law by National Competition Authorities at 2 (Nov. 2015). NCAs "suffer from low
staffing levels or limited financial resources compared to other NCAs" in Austria, Belgium,
Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, and Slovenia. Eur. Comm'n, Commission Staff Working Document:
Enhancing Competition Enforcement by the Member States' Competition Authorities: Institu-
tional and Procedural Issues, SWD(2014) 231 final, ¶ 36 (July 9, 2014).
101 Of course, they do this every day, by bringing cases, taking appeals, accepting commit-
ments/settlements, hiring staff, you name it. And some of these actions turn out to have lasting
impact. How different competition law would be, for instance, without merger guidelines and
effective leniency programs.
102 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
103 J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
104 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
105 Cf SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 444 (4th Cir. 2015) (Wilkinson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Wihat we confront in antitrust law is a perfect
storm of treble damages, large discovery costs, and relaxed pleading standards.").
106 Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies' Bi-Modal Penalties,
60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 127 (1997); see CARON BEATON-WELLS & ARIEL EZRACHI,
CRIMINALISING CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT
(2011); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, COMPETITION POL'Y
INT'L, Autumn 2010, at 3 (criminal debarment).
107 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442 n.18 (1978) ("Congress has
recently increased the criminal penalties for violation of the Sherman Act. Individual violations
are now treated as felonies punishable by a fine not to exceed $100,000, or by imprisonment for
up to three years, or both. Corporate violators are subject to a $1 million fine. 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976 ed.). The severity of these sanctions provides further support for our conclusion that the
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famously difficult experiences imposing criminal penalties.108 Ireland boasts
that it secured the first European criminal cartel conviction, and so long as one
counts by individual defendant rather than by proceeding, can say that it has
"succeeded in obtaining thirty-three convictions on indictment."109 But no one
has yet been sent o prison.110 Australia and Canada also still await that first
big step.'
It can be politically popular to increase penalties for competition violations.
The United States has done this a number of times, as have many other coun-
tries.1 1 2 In 2012 Ireland doubled maximum prison sentences, from five years
to ten, with the minister in charge saying that this was "sending out a very
strong signal to cartelists that competition offences are regarded as serious
offences by the legislature . .. ."113 Australia boldly established criminal pen-
alties and hiked fines1 1 4  But by increasing penalties, countries also in-
Sherman Act should not be construed as creating strict-liability crimes. Cf Sayre, Public Welfare
Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 72 (1933) (strict liability generally inappropriate when offense
punishable by imprisonment).").
108 See Norton Rose Fulbright, The Criminal Cartel Offence Around the World, COMPETITION
WORLD, Quarter 2 2016, at 6, 8, www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/competition-world-q2-
2016-141176.pdf ("Despite the gradual proliferation of the criminal cartel offence around the
world, the reality is that custodial sentences have been imposed only rarely outside the US.")
(describing how one UK prosecution "collapsed spectactularly," and only one unusual case suc-
ceeded, but adding that a revised offense, not requiring proof of "dishonesty," went into effect
Apr. 1, 2014).
109 PHILIP ANDREWS, PAUL GORECKI & DAVID MCFADDEN, MODERN IRISH COMPETITION LAW
§ 2.01[B] (2015); see also Patrick Massey, Criminalising Competition Law Offences: A Review
of Irish Experience, 3 NEW J. FUR. CRIM. L. 154 (2012).
110 Philip Andrews, Hard-Core Cartel Offender Gets C 7,500 Fine & Suspended Sentence,
MCCANN FITZGERALD (June 2, 2017); ANDREWS ET AL., MODERN IRISH COMPETITION LAW,
supra note 109, at § 2.01[B].
I Pallavi Guniganti, Australia and Canada Still Await Jail for Cartelists, GLOBAL COMPETI-
TIoN REv., Feb. 5, 2016, at 47.
112 See, e.g., Press Release, Auth. for Consumers Mkts., ACM Is Now Able to Impose Higher
Fines (July 1, 2016); Tom Azzopardi, Chile Hikes Fines, Jail Time for Collusion, BNA Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (July 15, 2016) (reintroducing prison sentences of between five and ten years;
maximum fine increased from current 16.5 billion Chilean pesos to twice the stimated benefit or
30% of sales in the relevant market over the relevant period); Press Release, Fur. Comm'n,
Competition: Commission Revises Guidelines for Setting Fines in Antitrust Cases (June 28,
2006) (IP/06/857).
113 See Competition and Consumer Law Nutshell-Penalties, MINTERELLISON (Feb. 15, 2013),
www.minterellison.com/articles/competition-and-consumer-law-nutshell-penalties ("Under the
2009 amendments, corporate civil pecuniary penalties were increased from a maximum of A$10
million per offence to the greater of A$10 million, three times the gain from the contravention
and, where that gain cannot be ascertained, 10% of group turnover."); see also Press Release,
MerrionStreet (Ir.), Maximum Prison Sentence for Competition Offences Doubled to Ten
Years-Minister Bruton; Competition [Amendment] Act 2012 Commenced (July 3, 2012). (Yet,
as noted, no one has served a day in prison.)
114 See Graeme Samuel, Cartel Reform and Compliance with the Trade Practices Act, Speech
at Austl. Corp. Lawyers Ass'n Nat'l Conference (Nov. 13, 2009), www.accc.gov.au/speech/car-
tel-reform-and-compliance-with-the-trade-practices-act; see also First Criminal Cartel Fine: $25
million, AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION LAW: BLOG (Aug. 3, 2017), australiancompetitionlaw.org/
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crease the cost of false positives and the challenge of bringing successful
cases.115
Of course, the goal should not be to have government enforcers and other
plaintiffs win as many cases as easily-and with as large penalties and recov-
eries-as possible. But before an agency supports some significant change, it
should work through the indirect adjustments that are likely to follow. All the
platitudes are true-there is no such thing as a free lunch; if something seems
too good to be true it probably is; moderation in all things.
B. PARTICIPATE IN THE COMPETITION CONVERSATION
Competition law is made by legislatures, enforcement agencies, and courts,
and each has a role in shaping it. Critical roles are played by lawyers who
interact with these players and with clients, and seek to influence the former
and guide the latter. All of this takes place in the context of an increasingly
robust debate among all of these, plus academics, other experts, and the gen-
eral and specialized media.
Competition agencies should participate in this debate through press re-
leases, speeches, workshops, publications, and, to the extent permitted by the
relevant legal system, amicus briefs.116 Agencies and the competition they
seek to preserve and increase will benefit from or be harmed by actions taken
by other players in the system (and by subsequent reactions), and agencies
owe it to the public to try to influence those actions. For many years it has
been recognized as sound policy for agencies to use a wide array of tools.117 It
makes sense to use them not only with respect to agency enforcement actions,
but also more generally.
blog/2017/08/03/first-criminal-cartel-fine-25-million/; Press Release, Austl. Competition & Con-
sumer Comm'n, Australia's First Criminal Cartel Charge Laid Against NYK (July 18, 2016).
"I See Robert Connolly, Thomas Farmer Acquitted in Puerto Rico Shipping Price Fixing
Trial, CARTEL CAPERS (May 11, 2015) ("[M]y opinion is that today cases go to trial because the
sentencing guidelines are so severe ... that the 'last man standing,' . . . has little to lose by going
to trial.").
116 For instance, the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division both have websites devoted to their
multifaceted work in health care. See Competition in the Health Care Marketplace, FED. TRADE
COMM'N; Health Care Competition, FED. TRADE COMM'N; Health Care, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE.
The FTC also has a website specifically devoted to its long-standing work on pay-for-delay
settlements. Pay For Delay, FED. TRADE COMM'N.
117 AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COMMISSION 19-20 (1989)
("The FTC's strengths are best employed in cases that challenge conduct in an industry in which
the FTC has gained experience by using its full panoply of powers, by publishing studies and by
giving guidance in various forms. Resources are conserved, quality is improved, and consistency
is increased by agency specialization.") (I served as counsel to the committee).
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Amicus briefs are particularly important because of the opportunity to con-
tribute to court opinions when an enforcement agency is not a party." Given
the role of equilibrating tendencies, amici need to remind courts of the context
that lay behind a decision. Consider Matsushita. Defendants-petitioners'
brief unsurprisingly cited Monsanto five times and quoted the "tends to ex-
clude the possibility of independent action" line twice.119 The Solicitor Gen-
eral, in an amicus brief filed three days after petitioners, cited Monsanto only
once, not quoting the "tends to exclude" line, but observing that summary
judgment can be especially important "in a case such as this one, where it is
alleged that defendants have violated the antitrust laws by charging prices that
are too low." 120 Missing was any caution about limiting the aggressive ap-
proach to summary judgment to vertical per se cases, or to those cases and to
predatory pricing cases. Although plaintiffs-respondents devoted a paragraph
118 Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation (Continued), in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
ANNUAL 2013 at 231 (Philip Lowe, Mel Marquis & Giorgio Monti eds., 2016); Stephen Calkins,
The Antitrust Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625 (2001). This is not just an American activity.
The European Commission has submitted written observations to national courts at least two or
three times a year since 2009. For observations authorized by the relevant national court to be
reported, see Fur. Comm'n, Commission Observations to National Courts (Amicus curiae obser-
vations, Article 15(3)), ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust amicus-curiae.html.
A powerful recent example is Woodman's Food Market, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 833 F.3d 743 (7th
Cir. 2016). The district court denied a motion to dismiss a challenge to Clorox's decision to
provide large-size packages only to warehouse clubs, relying particularly on FTC guidelines and
on two very old (1940 and 1956) opinions. Woodman's Food Mkt., Inc. v. Clorox Co., 2015 WL
420296 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 2, 2015). The court of appeals reversed in an opinion that gave great
weight to an FTC amicus brief disowning the old opinions and clarifying the guidelines. See
Brief of Fed. Trade Comm'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants and Reversal,
Woodman's Food Market, 833 F.3d 743 (No. 15-3001). The court explained that the Commis-
sion's "reasoned opinions deserve our respectful consideration." Woodman's Food Market, 833
F.3d at 749.
119 Brief for Petitioners at 13, 18, 20-21, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004); see also Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3-5, 9-10, Matsu-
shita, 475 U.S. 574 (No. 83-2004) (11 cites to Monsanto, with one reference to excluding the
possibility of independent action).
120 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-10, Matsushita,
475 U.S. 574 (No. 83-2004).
In First National Bank v. Cities Service Co.... this Court ruled that an antitrust plain-
tiff who seeks to prove the existence of an anticompetitive conspiracy on the basis of
circumstantial evidence in the form of parallel conduct can defeat summary judgment
only by showing that the evidence is more consistent with the inference that the con-
duct resulted from the alleged conspiracy than with the inference that it resulted from
independent action.... The Cities Service rule safeguards against the possibility that
parallel behavior manifesting only the workings of a competitive market might be
deemed illegal, an outcome that "could deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct."
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., No. 82-914 (Mar. 20, 1984), slip op. 8. It is
particularly important that courts adhere strictly to that rule in a case such as this one,
where it is alleged that defendants have violated the antitrust laws by charging prices
that are too low. Application of the Cities Service principle in such circumstances
avoids the imposition of penalties on independent, unilateral conduct that is reducing
prices, increasing competition, and thereby directly benefiting consumers.
Id.
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to Monsanto, in which they explained the distributor-termination background
of the case, they never disagreed with the appropriateness of the Monsanto
wording. Ironically, it was only the petitioners, in their reply brief, that sug-
gested (indirectly) limiting Monsanto:
Indeed, the decision in Monsanto expressly recognizes that courts must be
particularly vigilant against speculative antitrust conspiracy claims in a case
such as this, in which there is a threat that pro-competitive conduct (i.e., the
promotion of interbrand competition in Monsanto, and the charging of 'low'
prices here) may be penalized and deterred.121
The Supreme Court failed to set out in clear language any such limitation.
Judges do not operate in a vacuum, so even with respect to judicial think-
ing, multiple avenues should be pursued.122 And even apart from an interest in
influencing judges, it makes sense to nurture a culture of competition. Com-
petition advocacy has a well-earned reputation for providing a cost-effective
way to enhance competition.123 The sometimes-unexpected results that can
flow from equilibrating tendencies make it important regularly to be promot-
ing competition values.
C. NURTURE THE SYSTEM OF COMPETITION LAW
Agencies serve as guardians of the system of competition law. No other
entities have the incentive and ability to preserve what is good and lessen the
harm caused by what is bad. If the competition system is working well, con-
sumers will benefit, but agencies themselves will also benefit.
One easy example is FTC administrative adjudication. As a matter of basic
good government the agency wants this process to be efficient and fair, and
seen as such. Of course, it wants that. But the agency also wants this because
of the costs imposed by alternative perceptions. For instance, it is routine for
defendants to claim that lengthy administrative trials are an important factor
121 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 118, at 9.
122 As Andrew Gavil has written based on his review of internal Supreme Court papers, "Per-
haps the most significant revelation, however-and potentially the most worthy of continued
attention and debate-is the commanding role played by the economic intuitions of the Justices
and their seeming discretion to indulge those intuitions." Andrew I. Gavil, Antitrust Remedy
Wars Episode I: Illinois Brickfrom Inside the Supreme Court, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 553, 621
(2005).
123 See Advocacy, FED. TRADE COMM N, www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy; Competition Advocacy
Papers, DEP'T OF JUSTICE (June 30, 2015), www.justice.gov/atr/competition-advocacy-papers;
see also Advocacy, CANADIAN COMPETITION BUREAU (Nov. 5, 2015), www.competi-
tionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h 03557.html. The UK Competition and Markets Author-
ity gives more pointed advice to markets, for instance for grocery promotions to be clearer. See
Press Release, Competition and Mkts. Auth., Groceries Promotions to Be Clearer for Shoppers
(Apr. 27, 2016); see also Markets, Gov.UK, www.gov.uk/topic/competition/markets.
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that counsels against enjoining a merger pending such a trial. 124 The agency
has to want administrative adjudication to work efficiently if only to lessen
the impact of such arguments. Critics of the FTC's merger regime have also
emphasized "the specter of additional years-long administrative litigation" as
part of an argument for changing the merger rules under which the FTC oper-
ates.125 Thus, the Commission has responded to such critics by pointing to
rule revisions "to streamline the administrative process in response to con-
cerns that process was too protracted."126 And, indeed, the Commission has
periodically revised its rules "to streamline the adjudicative review process"
and "illustrate the agency's ongoing commitment to reviewing the Rules to
ensure the agency hearing process is as efficient as possible."127
Similarly the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition
has patiently listened to global (including American) complaints about alleged
due process failings.128 The administrative enforcement system has been criti-
124 See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1227-28 & n.8 (W.D. Mo. 1995) ("If the
Court issues an injunction, it is likely that Oak Hill will no longer be in business by the time the
FTC gets around to conducting a hearing on the merits of this dispute.") (claiming an average of
three years between complaint and initial decision), aff'd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).
125 The Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2015: Hearing
on S. 2102 Before the Subcomm on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 8 (2015) (testimony of Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr.). The
"SMARTER" Act, H.R. 2745 (companion to S. 2102), passed the House March 23, 2016, but
failed to advance. In 2017 it (now H.R. 659) has been voted out of committee (Apr. 5, 2017). See
H.R. 659-Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2017, CON-
GRESS.Gov, www.congress.gov/bill/l115th-congress/house-bill/659. This time the (acting) chair
of the FTC supports the legislation. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion's Path Ahead, 2 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 31, 38 (2017). And Mr. Lipsky was recently
acting director of the Bureau of Competition.
126 The Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2015: Hearing
on S. 2102 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman of the
Fed. Trade Comm'n).
127 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Modifies Part 3 of Agency's Rules of Practice
(Aug. 12, 2011); see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Issues Final Rules Amending
Parts 3 and 4 of the Agency's Rules of Practice (Apr. 27, 2009) (announcing changes that "expe-
dite the prehearing, hearing, and appeal phases; streamline discovery and motion practice; and
ensure that the FTC can apply its substantive expertise, as appropriate, earlier in the process.").
See generally D. Bruce Hoffman & M. Sean Royall, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Past,
Present, and Future, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 321-22 (2003) (reviewing earlier reforms).
128 See Ivo VAN BAEL, DUE PROCESS IN EU COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS (2011); Ian S. For-
rester, Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed Proce-
dures, 34 EUR. L. REV. 817 (2009); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Taylor M. Owings, Due Process in
Competition Proceedings, 11 COMPETITION L. INT'L 39 (Apr. 2015); Christopher B. Hockett,
From the [ABA Antitrust] Section Chair: Antitrust and Due Process, ANTITRUST, Spring 2014, at
3; Anne MacGregor & Bogdan Gecic, Due Process in EU Competition Cases Following the
Introduction of the New Best Practices Guidelines on Antitrust Proceedings, 3 J. EUR. COMPETI-
TIoN L. & PRAC. 425 (2012).
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cized as lacking fundamental hallmarks of fairness.129 The European Com-
mission has responded by repeatedly expanding the powers and functions of
the Hearing Officer, issuing "best practice" guidance documents, and taking
other steps to address concerns.13 0 Since perception matters as well as reality,
the Commission has also forcefully defended its administrative system as "ar-
guably one of the most transparent competition enforcement systems in the
world."131
Since courts will engage in equilibrating activities stimulated by private as
well as public enforcement, government agencies have a vested interest in a
competition enforcement system that functions well for both. In part this is
simply a recognition that case law made in private litigation, perhaps even in
response to private-litigation issues, impacts government enforcers. This is
obviously true in the United States, where outside of mergers and criminal
enforcement, antitrust pretty much is private antitrust.13 2 As only one sharp
example, Twombly is a private case motivated by concerns about private liti-
gation, but it provides the standard under which the Antitrust Division must
operate as well.133
129 See WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & MARIO MARINIELLO, COMPETITION AGENCY DESIGN IN
GLOBALISED MARKETS 7 (2016).
130 See, e.g., Wouter P.J. Wils, The Role of the Hearing Officer in Competition Proceedings
Before the European Commission, 35 WORLD COMPETITION 431 (2012); Wouter P.J. Wils, The
Oral Hearing in Competition Proceedings Before the European Commission, 35 WORLD COMPE-
TITION 397 (2012); Press Release, Fur. Comm'n, Competition: Commission Improves Rules for
Access to the File in Merger and Antitrust Procedures (Dec. 13, 2005) (IP/05/1581).
131 Philip Lowe, Dir. Gen. DG Competition, Fur. Comm'n, Remarks at CRA Conference on
Economic Developments in Competition Law: Due Process in Antitrust 7 (Dec. 9, 2009),
ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2009_19_en.pdf; see also Alexander Italianer, Dir.
Gen. DG Competition, Fur. Comm'n, Remarks at the Annual Conference on International Anti-
trust Law and Policy: Safeguarding Due Process in Antitrust Proceedings (Sept. 23, 2010),
ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp201OO6_en.pdf (reviewing improvements).
132 During the past decade, the United States was the plaintiff in only 2.1% of antitrust suits
filed in federal district courts. See Table C-2, U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Filed, by Juris-
diction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending December 31, [2007-16],
UNITED STATES COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/data-table-numbers/c-2. The proof of agreement Su-
preme Court cases discussed herein are private lawsuits, as are the key cases on: predatory pric-
ing-Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993);
boycott-NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998); refusal to deal-Verizon Com-
munications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); resale price mainte-
nance-Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); price
fixing-Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); tying-Illinois Tool Works Inc.
v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); market division-Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498
U.S. 46 (1990); price discrimination-Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco
GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006); and more.
133 See, e.g., United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp. 2d 665, 672-74
(E.D. Mich. 2011) (DOJ allegations "plausible" under Twombly); Plaintiffs' Response to Defen-
dant's Partial Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite Statement at 3 n.2,
United States v. Dean Foods Co., No. 2:10-cv-00059 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 11, 2010) (arguing that
Twombly preserved notice pleading).
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If a consensus develops that private plaintiffs' lawyers are bringing frivo-
lous or vexatious cases, this can harm the standing of competition law. If
"everyone knows" that plaintiffs' lawyers bring weak class actions and settle
them cheaply but with significant attorneys' fees, courts will be more likely to
turn a jaundiced eye on such class actions as come before them.134 The notori-
ous "coupon settlements"13 5 did real harm to private antitrust enforcement.
The Federal Trade Commission began getting involved in class action pol-
icy issues, filing amicus briefs opposing settlements it regarded as problem-
atic.13 6 Former Commissioner Leary explained that the FTC had an interest in
keeping costs down and helping real consumers, and also in making law "ap-
pear[ ] to be both sensible and fair." 13 7 This is not an abstract notion, but
rather one of considerable importance to the development of substantive com-
petition law. If participants in the antitrust system are abusing that system,
the resultant disrespect will prove harmful to government and private enforc-
ers alike.
Competition agencies benefit from a healthy system of private enforcement.
Weak cases are harmful-but strong cases are beneficial. Although the prin-
cipal benefits of private enforcement are compensation and deterrence,1 3 8
good private cases also can help develop sound and sometimes innovative
134 "To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And to a Court bent on diminishing the useful-
ness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled." Am. Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 252 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). American Express was
one of a series of cases celebrating arbitration as a preferred remedy in part because of "the risk
of 'in terrorem' settlements that class actions entail." AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333, 350 (2011).
1ss See, e.g., In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 950 (9th Cir. 2015)
The [Senate Judiciary Committee] report cites and criticizes coupon settlement awards
that provide class members with "$30 to $40 discounts" on a future cruise, "a $5 to
$10 voucher good for future purchases of particular computer hardware or software
products," "$1 off every subsequent $5 purchase" at a chain of restaurants, "a 30 per-
cent discount on selected products" during a one-week time period, $55 to use on a
purchase of a new crib from a defendant crib producer accused of making defective
cribs, "$1.25 off a $25 dollar [video] game", and so on.
Id. (second alteration in original) (citing S. REP. No. 109-14, at 15-17 (2005).
136 E.g., Federal Trade Commission's Memorandum of Law as Amicus Curiae, Moore v. Ver-
izon Commc'ns Inc., 2013 WL 4610764 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013) (No. CV 09-1823); see
Thomas B. Leary, Former Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks Before the Class Action
Litigation Summit (June 26, 2003); Cf Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Files Amicus
Brief in U.S. District Court Opposing Proposed Class Action Settlement with Debt Buyer Mid-
land Funding LLC (June 23, 2011) (consumer protection case); Fed. Trade Comm'n's Memoran-
dum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of
Opposing Class Counsel's Fee Application or, in the Alternative, to Participate as Amicus Cu-
riae, In re: First Databank Antitrust Litig., 96 F. Supp. 2d 96 (2002) (No. 1:01-cv-00870) (oppos-
ing allegedly excessive fees).
137 Leary, supra note 136.
138 Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private
Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REv. 1, 8 (2013).
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competition law.13 9 Lawyers involved in private litigation, on either side, may
end up joining an enforcement agency. Expert witnesses working for private
clients might later work for the government. It is so much healthier to have
two sides of issues that pay, not just one. And the realistic option of private
litigation means that government enforcers can decline to pursue a matter and
know that the complainants have a real alternative.
Agency interest in a healthy enforcement system provides an incentive to
get involved-through amicus filings, of course, but also through research,
testimony, speeches, conferences, and press releases. Thus, the agencies
properly weigh in on whether arbitration clauses improperly eliminate private
rights, because "[p]rivate actions are an important supplement to the govern-
ment's civil enforcement efforts under federal competition laws .... .140 And
when there is a risk of private standing being improperly denied, the agencies
should get involved: "The United States and the Federal Trade Commission
... have a strong interest in the substantive and procedural aspects of those
[antitrust] laws."141
It is of considerable importance to the European Commission and national
competition authorities, thus, that the transition to a more robust system of
private enforcement work well. It would be well worth investing resources in
monitoring developments and promoting sensible rules, procedures, and
decisions.
D. CORRECT MISPERCEPTIONS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS
What matters is not just the reality of the competition system, but also the
perception of the reality. If it is generally perceived that discovery is out of
control, that private litigation does little good, that FTC administrative adjudi-
139 Competition law has benefited from plaintiff "wins" in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S.
46 (1990) (per curiam); NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Georgia, 468 U.S. 85 (1984);
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643 (1980); and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975), but also from innovative lower-court cases, such as Spirit Airlines, Inc. v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005) (importance of "slots" in predatory pricing
success), and many more. The Solicitor General relied on successful private pay-for-delay cases
to persuade the Supreme Court that a circuit split called for granting the petition that resulted in
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013), see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FTC v. Watson
Pharm., Inc., No. 12-416, at 13 (citing In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214-18 (3d
Cir. 2012), vacated, Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 570 U.S. 913 (2013)
(remanded for further consideration in light of Actavis)); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332
F.3d 896, 905-09 (6th Cir. 2003); and Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799,
806-15 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). And even private plaintiff defeats clarify the law.
140 Brief for the United States [with the FTC] as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1,
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (No. 12-133) (Jan. 2013).
141 Brief for the United States and the Fed. Trade Comm'n as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellee at 1, Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. Sandisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No.
12-1183) (supporting standing to challenge fraudulently-procured patent monopoly).
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cation is unfair and takes too long, that due process is lacking, that politically
favored entities are unfairly favored, and so on, those perceptions are likely to
have consequences.1 4 2 When the perceptions are incorrect, it behooves an en-
forcement agency to try to correct them.
Correcting misperceptions is not always easy, especially when the mis-
perceptions benefit defendants and likely defendants. Major law firms tend,
as a general matter, to represent corporate clients that are much more likely to
be antitrust defendants than plaintiffs. The immensely talented lawyers at
those firms engage in honest commentary when writing or blogging or speak-
ing or working on bar association activities-but they have to know, in the
back of their minds, that the setting forth of positions likely to please defend-
ants is more likely to please clients and potential clients.143 Even academics
may well be serving as "of counsel" to a major law firm-again, writing and
speaking the truth as they see it but inevitably knowing that the firm's clients
might be more pleased with some efforts than with others.144 Any advocate
tasked with developing and advancing pro-defendant arguments is likely to
work creatively to identify and explicate arguments that are persuasive-often
to the advocate as well as the audience. Thus, there is a ready group of com-
mentators who might seem prone to emphasizing a more pro-defendant point
of view. Indeed, my European friends have noted that in the United States,
the "revolving door" tends to connect agencies and major law firms.145 Law-
yers from a few more plaintiff-oriented firms have joined the discussion, as
142 See Gavil, Bookends, supra note 41, at 24 (lamenting "the Court's repeated indulgence of
its now running, yet very debatable narrative, about abuses of the private right of action and the
limited uses of antitrust").
143 Knowledgeable observers can quickly think of examples where major law firms are retained
to promote agency intervention or even to bring lawsuits. As a general matter, however, law
firms are more likely to represent class action defendants than a class; to earn more substantial
fees representing merging parties than representing objectors; to defend rather than to bring mo-
nopolization/abuse of dominance cases; etc.
144 Service as "of counsel" can benefit the competition system by improving academics' under-
standing of the practice of law, by helping law firm clients better understand their obligations,
and by allowing academic expertise to improve advocacy, so, to be clear, I do not criticize the
practice (and indeed in the past have served as "of counsel" to a global law firm).
145 Of the 13 former Assistant Attorney Generals (including Acting) listed on the Division web
page, 10 went to major law firms: William J. Baer (Arnold & Porter); Thomas 0. Barnett (Cov-
ington); Deborah A. Garza (Covington); A. Douglas Melamed (WilmerHale, then I tel, and then
Stanford faculty); John M. Nannes (Skadden); Leslie C. Overton (Alston & Bird); Sharis A.
Pozen (Skadden, then General Electric); R. Hewitt Pate (Hunton & Williams, then Chevron);
Christine A. Varney (Cravath); and Joseph F. Wayland (Simpson Thacher). Three went directly
to corporations: Anne K. Bingaman (LCI International Corp., a long-distance carrier, then other
corporations); Charles A. James (Chevron); and Joel Klein (Bertelsmann, then Chancellor of
New York City Schools, then News Corp.). See Speeches by Former Assistant and Deputy Assis-
tant Attorneys General, DEP'T OF JUSTICE (June 16, 2017). None went to firms known for doing
plaintiffs' work, public interest organizations, or directly to academia.
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have some public interest organizations,146 but the scales are not evenly
balanced.
An agency can only try its best, using the full set of tools: speeches, arti-
cles, press releases, testimony, amicus briefs, and other publications. But it
should always be on the lookout for opportunities.147 Commissioner Maureen
Ohlhausen provided a particularly laudable example by responding to criti-
cism of FTC administrative adjudication by publishing a detailed study and
defense of the practice.148
A favorite personal example involves Judge Richard Posner's opinion in
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic.149 As originally issued,
the opinion contained somewhat exuberant praise for most favored nations
clauses.15 0 The FTC filed an amicus brief that succeeded in persuading the
court to qualify that praise. Twenty years later, the Second Circuit quoted that
corrected language as part of the important Justice Department win against
Apple. 151
E. INVEST IN RESEARCH
Competition enforcement-and competition enforcement agencies-bene-
fit from better understanding of the competition enforcement system. The
payoff may not be immediate, but it is very real.152 Research can be con-
ducted internally or, even better when properly arranged, by external
experts. 153
The FTC offers a number of good examples, including Commissioner
Ohlhausen's example referenced above. The Commission's multi-decade-
long campaign against anticompetitive "pay for delay" settlements was in-
146 Examples include the AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, www.antitrustinstitute.org (disclo-
sure: I serve on the advisory board); CONSUMERS UNION, consumersunion.org/; and CONSUMER
FEDERATION OF AMERICA, consumerfed.org/.
147 For a then-agency-official putting in a good word for litigation, see Stephen Calkins, In
Praise of Antitrust Litigation: The Second Annual Bernstein Lecture, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1
(1998).
148 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Effective Tool for Develop-
ing the Law or Rubber Stamp?, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 623 (2016).
149 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir.
1995).
130 For the full account, see Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, supra note 118, at 625.
1"I United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 320 (2d Cir. 2015) ("[W]e are breaking no new
ground in concluding that MFNs, though surely proper in many contexts, can be 'misused to
anticompetitive ends in some cases.'") (quoting Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d at 1415).
152 See William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency
Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REv. 295 (2016); AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT, supra note 117, at
87-91 (importance of research).
s13 For a good example, see AMELIA FLETCHER & BRUCE LYONS, GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFI-
NITION IN EUROPEAN COMMISSION MERGER CONTROL (2016).
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formed by two significant studies.15 4 Among the most powerful examples of
research paying dividends is the FTC's retrospective studies of hospital merg-
ers." An FTC-DOJ losing streak in challenging hospital mergers prompted
the FTC to use its investigatory powers to revisit hospital merger decisions.
The results both reinvigorated and refocused the agency's efforts, and re-
armed them with a persuasive story to tell.1 5 6
Research needs are not limited to areas of specific agency enforcement. It
matters if judges perceive antitrust as "a perfect storm of treble damages,
large discovery costs, and relaxed pleading standards,"157 and certainly one
can find assertions to that effect. 15  But is that "perfect storm" a reality? An-
titrust enforcement would benefit from additional good, reliable evidence.159
How accurate is Twombly's assertion that antitrust discovery is expensive?
As support for the proposition, Twombly quotes a 20 year old case (Associated
General Contractors) referring to "a potentially massive factual controversy"
and a Seventh Circuit opinion referring to the "costs of modern federal anti-
trust litigation." 16 0 But the latter refers principally to the former, and the for-
mer merely said that "[c]ertainly in a case of this magnitude, a district court
must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before al-
lowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed."161 Twombly also
cites a student law review note and the Manual for Complex Litigation, which
states that some antitrust litigation-not all-is appropriate for treatment as
154 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUM-
ERs BILLIONS (2010); FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRA-
TION: AN FTC STUDY (2002); see, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566
U.S. 399, 408 (2012) (relying on FTC study); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 404 n.21 (3d Cir. 2015) (same).
"I See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at George Washington
University School of Law, ABA Retrospective Analysis of Agency Determinations in Merger
Transactions Symposium: Retrospectives at the FTC: Promoting an Antitrust Agenda (June 28,
2013); Deborah L. Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at
AAI Healthcare Roundtable: Competition and Healthcare-Enforcement and Policy Priorities:
To Know Where You're Going, Look at Where You've Been (Feb. 22, 2017).
156 See, e.g., FTC v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2016); FTC v.
Penn. State Hershey Med. Ct., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016).
117 SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412,444 (4th Cir. 2015) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1's See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REv. 675 (2010).
159 For an impressive effort generally supportive of the benefits of private enforcement see
Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Pri-
vate Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1269 (2013).
160 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
161 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
528 n.17 (1983).
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complex litigation.1 62 Finally, it cites a Memorandum from the chair of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which reported that in cases (not just
antitrust cases) "where discovery is actively employed" it can represent "as
much as 90% of the litigation costs."1 63 Certainly this suggests there are is-
sues, but it is far from proving the point. And what is the point, anyway? A
major, complicated antitrust case may require more discovery-than what?
Than another major, complicated case? If all that one is saying is that some
antitrust cases are major and complicated, then that is not justification for
being demanding about complaints in all antitrust cases.
F. PROMOTE DESIRABLE EQUILIBRATION
Another self-evident point is that (re)adjustments can benefit consumers
(and make life easier for enforcement agencies), and there is no reason not o
highlight and promote such adjustments. Monsanto and Business Electronics
were directly responsive to the Court's concern about false positives flowing
from the per se rule for resale price maintenance. Courts were very demand-
ing of proof of a resale price agreement. But, of course, the per se rule for
resale price maintenance ended in 2007.164
Courts will adjust to that change. In 1984-more than 30 years ago-the
Court wrote that it was "of considerable importance that independent action
by the manufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distin-
guished from price-fixing agreements, since under present law the latter are
subject to per se treatment and treble damages."165 That distinction is now
obviously less important.166 Once an agreement is the beginning, rather than
the end, of analysis, courts are and should be more willing to find an agree-
ment.167 The competition agencies can speed up an adjustment by highlighting
162 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59 (citing William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of
One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1887, 1898-99 (2003)).
163 Id. at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil
Rules, to Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 192
F.R.D. 354, 357 (1999)).
1
64 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
165 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984).
166 For an energetic assertion that Leegin presents the opportunity to excise the "tends to ex-
clude" approach from vertical agreement cases-by the winning lawyer in Continental T. V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)-see M. Laurence Popofsky, Does Leegin Liberate the
Law Governing Horizontal Conspiracies from Its Vertical Contamination?, 78 ANTITRUST L.J.
23 (2012); see also Louis Kaplow, The Meaning of Vertical Agreement and the Structure of
Competition Law, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 563, 617 (2016) ("[B]ecause all vertical restraints are now
subject to the rule of reason, the Supreme Court may for that reason . . . be inclined to reverse
Colgate and Monsanto.").
167 The point is well presented in Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Leegin, The Rule of Reason, and
Vertical Agreement 6 (U. Iowa Legal Stud. Res., Paper No. 10-40, 2010); see also 8 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw ¶ 1623a (4th ed. 2017).
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this in speeches, publications, amicus briefs, and enforcement actions. They
can both take actions that serve to push back against excesses of Monsanto
and its adoption in Matsushita, and to highlight the changed circumstances
when doing so. (In the struggle over the proof required for an agreement,
recognition should also go to Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.'s1 68 holding
that some agreements on price are not price-fixing and to California Dental
Association v. FTC's1 69 caution about allowing "quick look" analysis of ques-
tionable agreements.)170
The FTC provided a recent example in In re Fortiline.171 This was an "invi-
tation to collude" case involving a distributor communicating to a manufac-
turer engaged in dual distribution-some selling to end customers, some
selling to distributors (including the respondent). Commissioner Ohlhausen
dissented, writing that she found the evidence "ambiguous" and was "con-
cerned that imposing liability in such equivocal factual circumstances may
chill procompetitive vertical conduct in markets with dual distribution."17 2 Al-
though the secrecy with which the actual evidence is protected makes a confi-
dent judgment difficult, the majority probably has the better of the argument.
(There was no opinion for the Commission, but here was a thoughtful Analy-
sis to Aid Public Comment.) That would make a good case for pushing back
against the excesses of Monsanto. It would have been better, however, had
the Analysis to Aid Public Comment noted the new post-Leegin day when it
cited Monsanto as part of its discussion.173
For another example of a possible opportunity to promote readjustment,
consider the recent dramatic changes in the rules governing discovery. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended effective December 1, 2015,
in substantial part to make discovery less burdensome. Now discovery must
be "proportional;" gone is the plaintiff-beloved wording, "reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."1 74 The revised rules
168 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
169 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
170 The struggle over proof of agreement is effectively highlighted by the contrast between the
majority and minority opinions in Valspar Corp. v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d
185 (3d Cir. 2017), with the latter arguing for reading Matsushita in context and the former
applying it broadly.
171 Agreement Containing Consent Order to Cease and Desist, Fortiline, LLC, FTC No. 151-
0000 (Aug. 9, 2016).
172 Dissenting Statement of Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Fortiline, FTC No. 151-0000.
173 Fortiline, LLC; Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 81 Fed. Reg. 54,085, 54,088 n.9 (Aug.
15, 2016) ("Certainly, market and price-related communications between a manufacturer and its
distributor can be appropriate and procompetitive.") (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp, 465 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1984)).
174 Rule 26(b)(1):
Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as
follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is rele-
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govern "in all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as
practicable, all proceedings then pending."17 5 Critics from the plaintiff-ori-
ented perspective have harshly attacked the changes as doing serious harm to
basic discovery rights;17 6 supporters disagree;1 7 7 everyone recognizes the po-
tential for change. The new rules are a "game changer" and a "paradigm
shift."1 7 1
To the extent that the change makes a real change179-and does so with
respect to competition cases-the legal system should adjust and be a bit less
keen to dismiss competition cases out of fear of the risk of discovery.18 0 The
competition agencies can hasten this adjustment by monitoring the issue and,
as appropriate, seeking opportunities to highlight any changes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Equilibrating tendencies matter. The U.S. competition law system is differ-
ent because the substantive law evolved in response to the context in which it
is applied: treble damages, attorneys' fees, liberal discovery, class actions, and
(in theory) jury trials. Equilibrating tendencies can help explain why Euro-
vant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, consid-
ering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of dis-
covery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
See Memorandum from Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure to Chair,
Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 14, 2014); see also David Crump,
Goodbye, "Reasonably Calculated"; You're Replaced by "Proportionality": Deciphering the
New Federal Scope of Discovery, 23 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1093 (2016); Brooke D. Coleman,
The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REv. 1777 (2015).
171 See Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf.
176 See Richard Briles Moriarty, And Now for Something Completely Diferent: Are the Federal
Civil Discovery Rules Moving Forward into a New Age or Shifting Backward into a "Dark"
Age?, 39 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 227 (2015); Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff
Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composi-
tion of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REv. 1083, 1088-54 (2015).
177 George Shepherd, Failed Experiment: Twombly, Iqbal, and Why Broad Pretrial Discovery
Should Be Further Eliminated, 49 IND. L. REv. 465 (2016).
178 Kenneth R. Berman, Reinventing Discovery Under the New Federal Rules, LITIG., Spring
2016, at 22.
179 For a suggestion that the changes may not be sufficient-but also a suggestion that courts
(perhaps encouraged by the Justice Department?) could make a difference, see Paula Schaefer,
Attorneys, Document Discovery, and Discipline, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2017).
1so Similarly, to the extent that class actions become a less prominent part of the U.S. system of
competition enforcement because of mandatory arbitration, see, for example, DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015), or because standards become more demanding, see for exam-
ple, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (Scalia, J.), substantive law should adjust.
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pean competition law continues to differ from U.S. law, despite considerable
influences pushing towards harmonization.
Now change is coming in Europe. National authorities have become im-
portant enforcers, and private enforcement is becoming a reality. The path of
change is uneven but it appears to be inevitable. Change builds on change.
With these important changes, equilibrating tendencies can be expected. The
lessons for enforcement agencies: anticipate equilibrating tendencies; partici-
pate in the competition conversation; nurture the system of competition law;
correct misperceptions and misunderstandings; invest in research; and pro-
mote desirable equilibration.
